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Abstract
In this article, we propose a new way of assessing environmental responsibility at the country level,
taking into account their trade balance in terms of carbon. Starting from the fact that the approach
based on the respective responsibilities of the producer and the consumer, which are widely promoted
and used in the literature, each have their own limitations, we introduce a modied formula for the
net trade balance of carbon at the country level. To do this, we examine the extent to which trade
ows for a given country increase or decrease global emissions relative to the virtual situation where
imports would have been produced in the consumer country. We argue that it would be fair for
countries to retain responsibility for the additional emissions they create when trading. We then
discuss the incentives provided by the modied liability rule to reduce emission intensity and extend
our formula to include trade in intermediate goods. Finally, we illustrate our concept using World
Bank and OECD data on trade ows and emission intensity ratios. Finally, we characterize six groups
of countries according to the respective order of their producer, consumer and our new liability rule.
JEL : F18, Q54, C67.
Key-words: International trade, carbon trade balance, consumer responsibility, producer respons-
ibility.
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous proposons une nouvelle façon dévaluer la responsabilité environnementale au
niveau des pays en tenant compte de leur balance commerciale en terme de carbone. Partant du fait
que lapproche fondée sur les responsabilités respectives du producteur et du consommateur, largement
encouragées et utilisées dans la littérature, ont chacune leurs propres limites, nous introduisons une
formule modiée pour la balance commerciale nette du carbone au niveau du pays. Pour ce faire, nous
examinons dans quelle mesure les ux commerciaux pour un pays donné augmentent ou diminuent les
émissions mondiales par rapport à la situation virtuelle où les importations auraient été produites dans
le pays de consommation. Nous soutenons quil serait juste que les pays conservent la responsabilité
des émissions supplémentaires quils créent lorsquils font du commerce. Nous discutons ensuite des
incitations apportées par la règle de responsabilité modiée pour diminuer lintensité en émissions et
étendons notre formule pour inclure le commerce des biens intermédiaires. Enn, nous illustrons notre
concept à laide de données de la Banque mondiale et de lOCDE sur les ux commerciaux et les ratios
dintensité en émissions. Enn, nous caractérisons six groupes de pays en fonction de lordre respectif
de leur responsabilité producteur, consommateur et de notre nouvelle règle de responsabilité.
JEL : F18, Q54, C67.
Mots-clés : Commerce international, balance commerciale du carbone, responsabilité du consom-
mateur, responsabilité du producteur.
On Sharing Responsibilities for Pollution Embodied in Trade
1 Introduction
Why and how to evaluate the international responsibility of a country with respect to its GHG
emissions and regarding other countries? First, evaluating the responsibility of a country or a region
is necessary to build adequate control and to establish reduction policies of GHG emissions (Peters and
Hertwich 2008). For instance, emission targets per country have been set up by the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) based on emissions produced domestically
under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries or regions that currently develop climate policies (like the EU
for instance) also base their measures on domestically produced emissions (Lininger 2013, Steininger
et al. 2014).
Second, two ways of accounting for emissions, along with other approaches, have been discussed
in the literature: producer responsibility and consumer responsibility. According to the principle of
producer responsibility, a country is responsible for the pollution emitted when producing domestically
goods and services, independently on whether consumption takes place in the country or abroad. This
way of evaluating responsibilities has been questioned on the basis of its fairness. One of the di¢ culties
in climate negotiations is clearly the raising importance of CO2 embodied in international trade over
the past twenty years. The 5th assessment report of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) points out that overall emissions rose twice as fast in the rst decade of the 21th century
than during the past three decades and a signicant part of this growth is due to international trade.
Peters et al. (2011) have found that the emissions from the production of traded goods and services
have increased from 4.3 Gt CO2 in 1990 to 7.8 Gt CO2 in 2008. More recently, Shapiro (2016) has
estimated that the opening of borders raises global CO2 emissions in the order of 5% compared to a
self su¢ cient situation without any international trade.
The main explanation is that the worlds richest countries are increasingly outsourcing their emis-
sions to other rising economies. According to the IPCC, "a growing share of emissions in developing
countries is released in the production of goods and services exported, notably from upper-middle-
income countries to high-income countries". As a result, the emissions actually produced in a country
need not be the same as the emissions that are necessary for consumption. The countries of the OECD,
for example, have a carbon footprint greater than the emissions carried out on their territory, while
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large emerging countries are in the opposite situation: they produce goods using polluting techniques
which are then shipped and consumed in developed countries (see Bureau et al., 2017).
It is therefore not surprising that less developed countries and emerging countries often argue
that a growing share of their emissions is due to the production of goods exported to rich countries
whose consumers should ultimately bear the responsibility from their viewpoint. They do not want
to be held responsible for emissions based on their production and would advocate in favor a criterion
of responsibility for emissions on the basis of their consumption. In parallel, big emitters like the
USA and some other developed countries regularly fear about their economys competitiveness to be
impaired if some other countries do not commit to curb their emissions, because of the possibility of
relocation of industries towards pollution havens and of any potential expansion of carbon leakage.
Not only does producer responsibility not account for the possibility for rich countries to outsource
their emissions abroad but it also creates some di¢ culty in assigning responsibility for emissions
that occurred during international transportation. Switching to consumer-based national emission
inventories has been suggested early in the literature (see e.g. Proops et al. 1993, Munksgaard and
Pedersen 2001, Bastianoni et al. 2004, Lenzen et al. 2007, Peters 2008). This approach, very similar
to the concept of ecological footprint, amounts to recognize that no matter where the polluting good
or service is produced, the impact is global and it is only if the nal consumer is responsible for this
impact that problems like polluting industries relocations and carbon leakage consequences could be
avoided.1 A rst counter-argument against switching to consumer responsibility is that it is simply
a shift from one extreme, allocation responsibility to producer only, to another extreme, allocating
responsibility to consumer only (Peters 2008). This drawback could be easily alleviated by introducing
the notion of shared responsibility (Lenzen et al. 2007) but it is not easy to dene the weight to be
put respectively on producers and consumers (Steininger et al. 2014) and to avoid double counting in
practice (see Gallego and Lenzen 2005 for a method to avoid this latter problem).
However, a shared responsibility between producers and consumers, could represent a compromise
solution in the international negotiations and facilitate the adoption of a consensus (Tuddenham,
2010). This is the goal we are pursuing in this paper: to nd a consensual criterion of allocation of
responsibilities for country emissions that could be used, for example, for a distribution of the nancing
burden of the energy transition. It is therefore not to nd an optimal taxation of CO2 emissions or
assist in the implementation of a trade policy aimed at correcting distortions in competitiveness
1See Lenzen and Murray (2010) for an approach applied to carbon footprint.
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between countries who practice unevenly stringent climate policies. Nevertheless, both issues are
closely related : a huge branch of the literature examining the design of border carbon adjustments
and discussing how to quantify emissions embodied in international trade, « indirectly also discusses
switching to a consumer-based approach - although in that strand of literature it is usually not termed
that way » (Lininger, 2013). In this branch of literature the method widely used to calculate emissions
embodied in trade is the Multi-Regional Input-Output analysis, (Arce et al., 2016; Sakai and Barrett,
2016; Rocchi et al, 2018) since the goal is to give an instrument to countries having a carbon pricing
mechanism in order to impose a border adjustment on products (Rocchi et al, 2018; Arto et al., 2014)
or sectors (Sakai and Barrett, 2016) imported from non-abating countries. For this purpose, Cadarso
et al. (2012) had proposed to share the responsibility of emissions along the global product chain
depending on the value added of each step of the chain with an application to Spain. Our goal here
is di¤erent: we aim to nd a sharing rule of country responsibility at the global level, taking into
account country participation to international trade.
Analyzing GHG emissions embodied in trade requires to compute a trade emission balance as
the di¤erence between emissions embodied in exports and those embodied in imports. Serrano and
Dietzenbacher (2010) prove that, at the global level, the trade emission balance approach actually
coincides with the country responsibility approach where one would compute the di¤erence between
emissions produced inside the country and the emissions required by its domestic nal consumption.2
In this paper, we present rst in a highly simplied framework, ignoring for trade in intermedi-
ate goods, the concept of producer-based, consumer-based and share responsibilities and exhibit the
net carbon trade balance that explain the di¤erence between producer-based and consumer-based
responsibilities. The consumer-based rule does not consider that imports from a more emission ef-
cient country actually help in reducing world level emissions. Similarly, the production-based rule
includes exports, even if exporting helps decreasing world emissions level when it goes towards less
emission e¢ cient countries. To take into account that trade may increase or decrease world emissions
level depending on the nature of energy use technologies employed by countries in bilateral trade,
we propose a modied denition of the net carbon trade balance. It amounts to a¤ect the trade
balance by the best emission intensity ratio in each of these bilateral trade relationships. We then
2Besides producers and consumers responsibilities, Marques et al. (2012) have proposed a new nomenclature dened
as income based responsibility (also called downstream responsibility by opposition to consumer responsibility inter-
preted as upstream responsibility). The idea there is to make primary producers of fossil fuels (e.g. Norway) responsible
instead of producers or consumers.
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show that, compared to the consumer-based rule, the modied rule will increase (reduce) a countrys
responsibility when it is creating more (less) emissions by exporting towards cleaner countries than
by importing from less clean countries.
We also show that this modied rule for sharing responsibilities has nice e¢ ciency properties
for incentives to invest in improving emission intensity at the country level. Note that, as long
as consumers are considered as (at least partially) responsible for emissions, the consumer-based
responsibility rule may induce countries to make less e¤orts to limit their emissions by reducing their
energy use ratio compared to the pure producer-based rule. Compared to a pure producer-based rule,
our modied rule increases the incentives to reduce emissions if and only if the country under scrutiny
is a global net importer from less emission e¢ cient countries. However, the modied rule diminishes
the incentives to reduce emissions when the country is a global net exporter towards less emission
e¢ cient countries. Now, compared to a pure consumer-based rule, the modied rule always increases
the incentives to reduce emissions. We see all the properties as rather desirable, especially compared
to the diminished incentives for energy savings provided by the consumer-based rule. Furthermore, we
extend straightforwardly the concept to the case of trade in intermediate products. Last, we provide
an illustrative application on a set of 98 countries, using data from the World Bank and from OECD.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides notations and an analysis of the di¤erence
between consumer, producer and shared responsibilities. It also presents the modied rule taking into
account the net impact of each bilateral trade on the world emissions level. Section 3 provides the
quantitative illustration. Section 4 concludes.
2 Analysis
2.1 Notations
Let us denote Pi as the measure of production (given by national GDP) for any country indexed by
i. Total exports of country i are denoted Xi =
P
j Xij where Xij denotes exports from country i to
some other country j with Xii = 0. Similarly, total imports are Mi =
P
jMji where Mji denotes
imports in country i from country j with Mii = 0. By construction, total exports coincide with total
imports at the world level (
P
iXi =
P
iMi) and by denition imports in i from j must be equal to
export from j to i (Mji = Xji).
We also denote Ei countrys i emission intensity measure expressed in CO2 emissions per $ of GDP
and suppose that countries are indexed with i = 1::::n such that E1 < E2 < :::: < En. This allows to
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dene the net carbon trade balance i for country i as follows:
i =
X
j
EjMji   EiXi:
The measure i expresses whether country i is a net CO2 global importer (i > 0) or a net CO2
global exporter (i < 0).
2.2 Consumer-based versus producer-based responsibilities
Using these notations, we can dene the standard producer-based emissions accounting principle as
follows:
Rpi = EiPi (1)
which ignores completely the trade ows for country i.
By contrast, the consumer-based emissions accounting principle is dened as adding the net carbon
trade balance to producer-based emissions:
Rci = R
p
i + i (2)
where emissions embodied in exports Xi are taken out of the responsibility while emissions embodied
in imports (from all partners) are taken into account. The responsibility Rci is thus larger than R
p
i
whenever country i is a net CO2 global importer and lower in the opposite case of a net CO2 exporter.
These two denitions are di¤erent ways of allocating emissions responsibilities across countries but
their corresponding aggregate responsibilities naturally coincide at the world level:
X
i
Rci =
X
i
Rpi
as by construction net carbon trade is balanced at the world level,
P
i i =
P
i;j EjMji 
P
iEiXi =P
j EjXj  
P
iEiXi = 0.
The responsibilities Rpi and R
c
i are clearly polar cases. A natural way to describe all other possible
emissions accounting principles between producer-based and consumer-based would be to assume that
consumer is responsible for a portion  2 (0; 1) of emissions while the producer is responsible for the
remaining portion 1  . This amounts to dene the responsibility Ri() as follows:
Ri() = Ei(Pi  Xi) + 
X
j
EjMji + (1  )EiXi
= Rpi + i
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so that with  = 0, responsibility is producer-based (Ri(0) = R
p
i ) while for  = 1, it is consumer-based
(Ri(1) = Rci ). While attractive at rst sight, as argued by Steininger et al. (2014) « it is di¢ cult or
impossible to determine shares of causal responsibility among them » . Hence, there is no easy way to
choose a value for  or to reach a consensus on it.
2.3 A new way to measure net carbon trade balance
The consumer-based responsibility rule Rci allows to take into account trade impacts in an aggregate
way. Indeed, a country that is a global net importer of carbon will see its burden raised compared
to the producer-based rule. However, this rule fails to consider that imports from a more emission
e¢ cient country actually help in reducing world level emissions. Similarly, exports are included in the
producer-based rule Rpi , even if exporting helps decreasing world emissions level when it goes towards
less emission e¢ cient countries.
To see this, consider a world with two countries only indexed by 1 and 2; and assume without
loss of generality that country 1 is more e¢ cient than country 2 w.r.t the emission intensity ratio
(E1 < E2). The world emissions level is R
p
1 + R
p
2 = E1P1 + E2P2 and it depends on the emission
intensity ratios E1 and E2. In the present example, trade increases (decreases) world emissions by an
amount equal to (E2   E1)(M1  X1) when country 1 is a net importer (exporter), compared to the
virtual situation where each country would have its consumption entirely produced domestically.
In this example, the consumer-based rule would prescribe the following responsibilities:
Rc1 = R
p
1 + 1 = E1P1 + E2M1   E1X1 (3)
Rc2 = R
p
2 + 2 = E2P2 + E1M2   E2X2 (4)
Country 1 is thus fully responsible for all its imports from the more polluting country, but country
2 is not responsible for its exports towards a cleaner country. This unbalanced share of responsibility
between the two countries could be amended by considering that country 2 should retain full respons-
ibility for the extra emissions (E2   E1)X2 > 0 for its exports X2 towards the less polluting country
1, compared to the ctitious situation where these exports from 2 to 1 could have been produced in
country 1 using the best technology there. We thus dene a modied responsibility rule R^2 for this
country as follows:
R^2 = R
c
2 + (E2   E1)X2
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which can be rewritten using (4) as:
R^2 = R
p
2 + E1 (M2  X2) :
To keep constant the sum of responsibilities, we then reduce the consumer-based responsibility
of the cleaner country 1 by the same amount (E2   E1)X2 > 0. Hence, we dene the modied
responsibility rule R^1 for country 1 as follows:
R^1 = R
c
1   (E2   E1)X2
which can be rewritten using (3) as
R^1 = R
p
1 + E1(M1  X1)
To sum up, in our two countries example, we can express a modied net carbon trade balance, to be
added to the producer-based responsibility, as follows, for i = 1; 2:
^i = (Mi  Xi) min(E1; E2)
and the modied responsibility rule for country i = 1; 2 is R^i = R
p
i + ^i.
This modied rule can be easily generalized to a world with an arbitrary number of countries:
there, a more polluting country i exporting to a cleaner country j creates additional emissions equal
to (Ei   Ej)Xij > 0 compared to the case where the cleaner country would produce what it consumes.
Once again, we would like the country i to retain responsibility for the additional emissions (and to
reduce by the same amount the responsibility of the cleaner country j). By summing over all bilateral
relationships, we dene the following modied formula for the net carbon trade balance of country i
as follows:
^i =
X
j
(Mji  Xij) min(Ei; Ej)
where it is a function of the best emission intensity ratio in each bilateral relationship. Thereby, the
emissions responsibility rule for country i would write:
R^i = R
p
i + ^i (5)
Each country would be responsible for the emissions created by its production net of its modied
net carbon trade balance. Of course, this new rule makes sense if and only if it is balanced at the
world level, i.e.
P
i ^i = 0, which follows from the fact that it is balanced at each bilateral level
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by construction. Furthermore, the modied responsibility rule can be straightforwardly generalized
to take into account trade in intermediate input products with di¤erent sectors and also to multiple
pollutants (see Appendix A for a detailed analysis). This is important as trade in intermediates has a
major role in explaining recent growth in international trade because it is key to o¤shoring processes
and global value chains (see e.g. Johnson and Noguera, 2012, Koopman et al., 2012, 2014).
Recall that here the responsibility of any country i is increased each times it exports toward a
cleaner partner and is reduced each times it imports from a less clean partner. We thus have the
following result by comparing i and ^i. Without loss of generality, we assume that countries are
indexed by i such that E1 < ::: < En.
Proposition 1 R^i > (<)Rci when the sum of emissions created by exporting towards cleaner countries,Pi
j=1(Ei   Ej)Xij, is larger (lower) than the sum of emissions created by importing from less clean
countries,
Pn
j=i+1(Ej   Ei)Mji.
Proof: We have:
i   ^i =
X
j
EjMji   EiXi  
X
j
(Mji  Xij) min(Ei; Ej)
=
X
j
EjMji   Ei
X
j
Xij  
24 iX
j=1
Ej(Mji  Xij) + Ei
nX
j=i+1
(Mji  Xij)
35
=
nX
j=i+1
(Ej   Ei)| {z }
>0
Mji +
iX
j=1
(Ej   Ei)| {z }
<0
Xij
Compared to the consumer-based rule, our modied rule will increase (reduce) a countrys re-
sponsibility when it is creating more (less) emissions by exporting towards cleaner countries than by
importing from less clean countries.
Furthermore, we can also compare the two rules with respect to the incentives to adapt emission
intensity to reduce the responsibility. Take rst the rule dened by (2), di¤erentiate Ri with respect
to Ei and obtain:
@Rci
@Ei
= Pi  Xi < @R
p
i
@Ei
= Pi
As long as consumers are considered as (at least partially) responsible for emissions, the rule
may induce countries to make less e¤orts to limit their emissions by reducing their emission intensity
compared to the pure production-based rule Rpi . By contrast, the rule R^i does not face such an issue
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as we now expose. Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to Ei we obtain:
@R^i
@Ei
= Pi +
@^i
@Ei
:
Rewriting ^i, we get:
^i =
X
j
(Mji  Xij) min(Ei; Ej)
=
iX
j=1
Ej(Mji  Xij) +
nX
j=i+1
Ei(Mji  Xij)
and consequently:
@^i
@Ei
=
nX
j=i+1
(Mji  Xij)
We thus formulate the following result.
Proposition 2 Compared to a pure producer-based rule, the modied rule R^i increases (decreases)
the incentives to reduce emission intensity Ei i¤ country i is a global net importer (exporter) from
countries that are less e¢ cient with respect to emissions.
Hence, the modied rule has mixed impacts on the incentives to reduce emission intensity compared
to the producer-based rule, increasing incentives to be cleaner for some and reducing them for others.
But, one can show a more positive result when comparing Rci and R^i as we now do in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 3 Compared to a pure consumer-based rule Rci , the modied rule R^i always increases
the incentives to reduce emission intensity.
Proof: To see that @R^i@Ei >
@Rci
@Ei
, we compute the di¤erence:
@R^i
@Ei
  @R
c
i
@Ei
=
@^i
@Ei
+Xi =
nX
j=i+1
(Mji  Xij) +
X
j
Xij =
nX
j=i+1
Mji +
iX
j=1
Xij > 0:
3 Application
To illustrate our proposed measure of carbon trade balance, we propose to calculate the responsibilities
in global emissions for 98 countries according to the three criteria described in the analysis above.
The data used are from the World Bank for GDP and CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP. For bilateral
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Figure 1: The ten most polluting countries according to their producer responsibility (in % of global
emissions).
exports and imports, we used the OECD balanced international merchandise trade statistics.3 We
selected the year 2015, which is the most recent year for which we had all the necessary data. In Table
1 (see the Appendix B), the results are presented in absolute values and as a percentage of countries
responsibility for global emissions. Figure 1 shows that, whatever the criterion used, there is a group
of ten countries that each account for more than 2% of global emissions, the two largest emitters being
by far China and the United States, which together are responsible, whatever the basis used, for more
than 55% of global emissions.
Comparing the responsibility of each country based on our composite criterion with that based on
their production and consumption leads us to distinguish six possible cases according to the relative
ranking between Rpi , R
c
i and R^i or equivalently between 0; i and ^i. Figure 2 presents the six
groups and indicates for each the number of countries concerned.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the modied rule R^i changes the status of countries only in group
4 and 2, compared to the usual formulation Ri of the net carbon trade balance. In particular, while
the sample has 74 countries out of 98 that are net importers of CO2, i.e. i > 0; the modied rule
3 In theory, the exports of country A to country B should mirror the imports of country B from country A. In
practice this is however rarely the case, due to a variety of factors including for example di¤erences in valuation
(CIF for imports and FOB for exports), in partner country classication, in customs regimes, and in compilation and
dissemination methodologies. The asymmetries between the export and import values for the same trade ow have
long been recognised as an important factor that limits the analytical and policy use of international merchandise trade
statistics. To tackle this issue, the OECD has developed an approach to reconcile international merchandise trade
statistics.
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Rci > R
p
i R
c
i < R
p
i
Net importer of CO2 Net exporter of CO2
R^i > R
p
i
Group 1 (58) Group 6 (0) Group 4 (8)
Rci > R^i > R
p
i R^i > R
c
i > R
p
i R
c
i < R
p
i < R^i
R^i < R
p
i
Group 2 (16) Group 5 (4) Group 3 (12)
Rci > R
p
i > R^i R^i < R
c
i < R
p
i R
c
i < R^i < R
p
i
Figure 2: Classication of countries according to the sign and relative rankings of Rpi , R
c
i and R^i. The
number in italic between brackets indicates the number of countries in the group.
Figure 3: Net importers of CO2 (groups 1 and 2) and net exporters of CO2 (groups 3, 4 and 5).
R^i decreases their number to 66. Figure 3 indicates on a world map the group of all countries in the
sample.
Consider rst the countries that are net importers of C02 (i > 0), that is groups 1, 2 and
6. For all these regions, their consumer-based responsibility is greater than their producer-based
responsibility, Rci > R
p
i .
 Among these countries, the group 1 is made up of countries with trade decits: they are net
importers and consume more than they produce. According to our criterion, their responsibility
remains greater than their producer-based responsibility (i.e. ^i > 0) but is less than their
consumer-based responsibility, ^i < i, since part of the responsibility for emissions linked
to their imports from more polluting countries is now allocated to the latter. We thus have
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Rpi < R^i < R
c
i for group 1 where one can nd among others, by order of importance, the United
States, India, United Kingdom, France and Saudi Arabia (see Figure). Note that nearly 60%
of our sample (58 countries) belong to this group and it is particularly interesting to nd there
countries that belong to di¤erent classes in terms of national wealth according to the World
Bank.
 The group 2 also concerns net CO2 importing countries (i > 0). But the modied net carbon
trade balance is now negative, ^i < 0. Thereby, their exchanges contribute to reducing global
emissions since they mainly export to more polluting countries. This is the case of Japan,
Canada and Switzerland for example.4 These countries would be penalized by a consumer-based
responsibility rule, which attributes to them all emissions linked to their imports and which
gives them a status of net importer of CO2 even if some of them have sizeable trade surplus. On
the contrary, according to our modied rule, their responsibility is reduced compared to their
consumer-based responsibility and their producer-based responsibility: R^i < R
p
i < R
c
i .
 Note that a third possible case (denoted group 6 ) among net importers of CO2 could be the
case where ^i > i so that the new responsibility rule amounts to increase the environmental
liability over the consumer or the producer-based responsibilities: Rpi < R
c
i < R^i. There actually
none country in this case in our sample.
Now consider the countries that are net exporters of CO2, i.e. groups 3, 4 and 5 for which the
net carbon trade balance dened by i is negative. Their producer responsibility is therefore greater
than their consumer responsibility and there are 24 countries out of 98 in this case. Once again, there
are three possible cases that we detail below.
 Among these countries, the group 3 is made up of countries with i < ^i < 0 so that Rci <
R^i < R
p
i . We nd there China, Russia, South Korea and Australia among others. These
countries are often net exporters and among the most polluting countries and therefore they
contribute through their trade to an increase in global emissions.5 According to our rule, their
responsibility is increased compared to their consumer responsibility since they now retain part
4For example, among the nine largest importing countries from Japan, six countries (United States, China, Korea,
Thailand, Australia, Vietnam) that account for more than 56% of Japans world exports have a much higher level of
emissions per dollar of GDP than Japan. Also, nearly 80% of Canadas exports and 72% of its imports are due to trade
with only two countries: the United States and China, that have a much higher level of emissions per dollar of GDP
than Canada.
5 In the ranking of our countries from least polluting to most polluting, in terms of CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP,
China ranks 94th out of 98, South Africa 96th, Russia 89th, Korea 86th, Australia 85th.
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of the responsibility for emissions linked to their exports to less polluting countries. Nevertheless,
since they are major net exporters, their responsibility under our criterion remains lower than
their responsibility based on their production since ^i < 0. Hence, we have .
 The group 4 also concerns net CO2 exporting countries (i < 0) but the modied rule entails
^i > 0 so that Rci < R
p
i < R^i. The modied rule amounts to give them a larger responsibility
than under the producer-based rule. The countries concerned are among the most polluting
countries and their trade contributes to increase global emissions. This is for example the
case of Ukraine which has a positive trade surplus and which is, just before Mongolia, the
most polluting country in our country sample.6 According to our criterion, its responsibility is
increased in relation to its consumption-based responsibility (since it retains now a large share
of responsibility for emissions related to its exports) and also in relation to its production-based
responsibility. There is also Poland, a net CO2 exporting country, but unlike Ukraine, it has a
trade decit. It is its very high level of CO2 emissions per $ of GDP that makes this country,
which is a trade decit region, a net CO2 exporting country (i < 0).
 Last, the group 5 still concerns net CO2 exporting countries but these countries, which we call
Virtuous Traders, have a trade surplus and they are among the least polluting countries. Hence,
their trade position actually contributes overall to reducing global emissions. According to our
criterion, their responsibility is reduced compared to their consumer-based responsibility since
part of the responsibility for emissions linked to their imports from more polluting countries is
now allocated to these countries. We obtain in this group that R^i < Rci < R
p
i . It is of particular
interest to point out that in this small group of 4 countries we have rich countries like Germany
and Norway but also intermediary countries like Thailand.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new way to evaluate the environmental responsibility of one country by
taking into account its carbon trade balance. Starting from the fact that both the production-based
and the consumer-based approaches widely promoted and used in the literature have each their own
limitations, we want to propose a consensus criterion that would help, for example, to establish a rule
for sharing the annual nancial burden of the energy transition.
6 In our ranking of countries from least polluting to most polluting, in terms of CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP,
Ukraine is 97th out of 98, Poland is 79th.
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This criterion must take into account some national characteristics. In particular, we would like
to take into account the wealth of countries, the e¤orts they have already made to decrease their
emissions and the producer versus consumer responsibility.
To have some chance of being accepted by as many countries as possible, a burden sharing rule
must be simple and be based on criteria or observable indicators by all, like harddata. Remember
that, as argued by Peters (2008) the main fault of a consumer-based emissions inventories is that it
requires more complex calculations and consequently results may be more often subject to errors, bias
and uncertainty. Moreover, even if the regulation of emissions is not the rst objective of our rule, it
goes without saying that it should not lead countries to more polluting behavior. Finally the burden
sharing rule must be such that the sum of countriesresponsibility coincides with the world emissions.
We introduce a modied formula for the net carbon trade balance at the countrys level, using
perfectly observable data: GDP, CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP, bilateral exports and imports.
For this, we consider to what extent trade ows for a specic country increases or decreases global
emissions compared to the virtual situation where imports would have been produced domestically.
We argue that it would be fair for countries to retain responsibility for the additional emissions they
create when they trade, if any. The modied formula for a country net carbon trade balance that we
propose is a function of the best e¢ ciency use ratio in each bilateral relationship.
We illustrate our concept using data from the World Bank and OECD on trade ows and emission
ratios for 98 countries. We characterize six possible groups of countries according to the respective
order of their producer and consumer responsibility and according to our composite criterion. As
shown in Section 3, where we summarize the main trends of our results, our responsibility criterion
allows to distinguish between countries for which trade contributes to decrease emissions and thus
their responsibility is attenuated compared to their consumer responsibility and those for which trade
contributes to increase emissions so that their responsibility is augmented compared to their consumer
responsibility. In each category, emblematic countries oppose and it is particularly interesting to nd,
in some same groups, countries classied di¤erently by the World Bank in terms of national Wealth,
which is a good signal of the acceptability of our rule by countries.
We also nd that the incentives brought by the modied responsibility rule to improve on energy
e¢ ciency are rather interesting in many situations. Moreover, we extend our formula to include trade
in intermediate input goods. It could be interesting to apply our concept to evaluating emission
responsibility by distinguishing between trade in nal and intermediate goods in a world with N
14
countries with S sectors and compare the results to our aggregated calculations considering each
economy to consist of just a single sector with one single economy-wide emission intensity.
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Appendix
A Generalization to trade in intermediate input goods
Similarly to e.g. Serrano and Dietzenbacher (2010), consider a world with N countries with S sectors
(indexed by s = 1:::S) in each. Each sector produces one good that can be used as a nal consumption
good or as an intermediate input for other sectors. Production Pi in country i = 1:::N thus writes:
Pi = Ci +Xi +
X
j
AijPj (6)
where Ci is the domestic consumption of nal goods produced in i, Xi denotes the nal goods exported
in the rest of the world. Matrix Aij denotes the matrix of domestic inputs consumed at home (when
j = i) or exported to be used in production elsewhere (when j 6= i).
By considering the system P = C+X+AP obtained from (6), it follows that:
Pi =
X
j
Bij(Cj +Xj)
where Bij is an element of matrix B = (I A) 1. Denote Ei the vector of emissions coe¢ cient for
all sectors in country i and an element of Ei is eis which indicates the domestic emission of CO2 per
unit of output in industry/sector s in country i.7
We can now dene the producer responsibility as:
Rpi = EiPi =
X
j
EiBij(Cj +Xj): (7)
Similarly, the consumer responsibility is dened as follows:
Rci =
X
j
EjBjiCi +
X
j
(
X
k
EkBkj)Xji (8)
where the rst term denotes the emissions needed to produce domestically the nal consumption Ci
using domestic and foreign intermediate inputs while the second term represents all the emissions
needed to produce the imports coming from partner j, equal to Xji; via the use of inputs produced
both domestically and abroad.8
7For simplicity, we do not consider here the possibility of having M > 1 pollutants but extending the model to this
context is straightforward. In such a case, Ei is a matrice whose generic element is emis that represents the domestic
emissions for pollutant m per unit of output in sector s in country i.
8Recall that by convention Xii = 0.
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One can check immediately that
P
iR
p
i =
P
iR
c
i as:X
i
Rci =
X
i;j
EjBjiCi +
X
i;j
(
X
k
EkBkj)Xji
=
X
i;j
EjBjiCi +
X
j;k
EkBkjXj
=
X
i
Rpi
We can express the emissions needed for the exports of nal products and intermediate inputs for
country i : X
j
EjBjiXi +
X
j 6=i
EiBij(Cj +Xj) (9)
where the rst term denotes the emissions needed to produce and export nal products Xi (using
domestic and foreign inputs) while the second term denotes the emissions needed to produce interme-
diary inputs to be exported elsewhere in order to produce nal products. Similarly, we can express
the emissions needed for the imports of nal products and intermediate inputs for country i :
X
j 6=i
EjBji(Ci +Xi) +
X
j
(
X
k
EkBkj)Xji (10)
where the rst term denotes the emissions needed to produce foreign intermediary inputs that are
imported to produce domestic consumptions and exports while the second term denotes the emissions
needed to produce all nal products imports Xji from domestic and foreign inputs. The net carbon
trade balance i for country i can then be computed by subtracting (9) to (10):
i =
X
j 6=i
EjBji(Ci +Xi) +
X
j
(
X
k
EkBkj)Xji
 
X
j
EjBjiXi  
X
j 6=i
EiBij(Cj +Xj)
which simplies into:
i =
X
j 6=i
EjBjiCi +
X
j
(
X
k
EkBkj)Xji   EiBiiXi  
X
j 6=i
EiBij(Cj +Xj)
=
X
j 6=i
0@EjBjiCi + (X
k 6=i
EkBkj)Xji
1A X
j 6=i
Ei
0@BiiXij +Bij
0@Cj +X
k 6=i
Xjk
1A1A
where the last line follows from collecting all the terms in Ei. Note that by inverting k and j the
second term in the rst bracket rewrites:
X
j 6=i
X
k 6=i
EkBkjXji =
X
j 6=i
X
k 6=i
EjBjkXki
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Replacing, we get the following expression for the net carbon trade balance:
i =
X
j 6=i
Ej
0@BjiCi +X
k 6=i
BjkXki
1A
| {z }
foreign emissions needed for imported
intermediary inputs and imports of nal products
 
X
j 6=i
Ei
0@BiiXij +Bij
0@Cj +X
k 6=i
Xjk
1A1A
| {z }
domestic emissions needed for exports
of nal products and intermediary inputs
(11)
Note that in this net carbon trade balance, all the foreign emissions that are rst imported and then
exported again have naturally disappeared by cancelling each other out. This is also the case for all
domestic emissions that are rst exported and then imported again.
Finally, one can check easily that, by using (7), (8) and (11), the usual relationship between
producer, consumer and net carbon trade balance continue to hold in this generalized context:
Rci = R
p
i + i:
We are now in a position to derive our composite sharing rule for responsibilities ^i. Adapting our
rule, we dene a new vector of emissions coe¢ cients as follows:
E^ij = (min(ei1; ej1); ::;min(eis; ejs); ::;min(eiS ; ejS))
where to each sector s = 1:::S we associate the least polluting technology among the two trade partners
i and j. We can thus dene ^i as follows:
^i =
X
j 6=i
E^ij
0BBBBB@BjiCi +
X
k 6=i
BjkXki  BiiXij  Bij
0@Cj +X
k 6=i
Xjk
1A
| {z }
net trade balance
1CCCCCA
and the proposed composite sharing rule is now:
R^i = R
p
i + ^i:
B Results for the application
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Table 1: Pollution responsibilities in absolute values (tons
of CO2) and in percentage.
Name Rp Rc R^ Rp % Rc % R^ %
Albania 1790964425 2671648005 2252270831 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Algeria 42059569270 46512890723 45228536536 0,19% 0,21% 0,20%
Argentina 1,29E+11 1,33E+11 1,30E+11 0,58% 0,60% 0,59%
Armenia 2501118330 2980543507 2691908567 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Australia 4,80E+11 4,75E+11 4,77E+11 2,17% 2,15% 2,15%
Austria 58084060243 68424955822 58320139695 0,26% 0,31% 0,26%
Azerbaijan 11692864436 12894750053 12067677367 0,05% 0,06% 0,05%
Bahrain 17121530282 12580526071 16514687177 0,08% 0,06% 0,07%
Bangladesh 29076363810 40368844867 30779093848 0,13% 0,18% 0,14%
Belarus 20807141079 24298281979 23208677217 0,09% 0,11% 0,10%
Belgium 87768739695 1,02E+11 88307206328 0,40% 0,46% 0,40%
Bolivia 9917518833 9508597338 9909061542 0,04% 0,04% 0,04%
Bosnia Herzegovina 9092565316 8111310383 9721724838 0,04% 0,04% 0,04%
Brazil 2,81E+11 3,02E+11 2,77E+11 1,27% 1,37% 1,25%
Bulgaria 16421594599 15537875386 17346485499 0,07% 0,07% 0,08%
Cambodia 2181738460 6128765417 2424994037 0,01% 0,03% 0,01%
Canada 4,76E+11 4,80E+11 4,75E+11 2,15% 2,17% 2,15%
Chile 50544891439 57335153624 50228364056 0,23% 0,26% 0,23%
China 6,76E+12 5,82E+12 6,56E+12 30,53% 26,31% 29,67%
Colombia 43452728155 53235661655 45192018414 0,20% 0,24% 0,20%
Costa Rica 6044854226 9049012892 6462475409 0,03% 0,04% 0,03%
Croatia 9354468186 12078407864 10841809764 0,04% 0,05% 0,05%
Cyprus 4409374147 5762962323 5385825167 0,02% 0,03% 0,02%
Czech Republic 56939622427 46771748829 56269284990 0,26% 0,21% 0,25%
Denmark 43677432498 50479071255 43328175654 0,20% 0,23% 0,20%
Egypt, Arab Rep. 77324399982 97239971121 88672201762 0,35% 0,44% 0,40%
Estonia 12359056534 10307196550 13886398220 0,06% 0,05% 0,06%
France 3,09E+11 3,72E+11 3,15E+11 1,40% 1,68% 1,42%
Georgia 3251709920 5010106208 4291178115 0,01% 0,02% 0,02%
Germany 6,98E+11 6,83E+11 6,50E+11 3,15% 3,09% 2,94%
Continued on next page
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Table 1 continued from previous page
Name Rp Rc R^ Rp % Rc % R^ %
Greece 47045547046 52715065019 50364636309 0,21% 0,24% 0,23%
Guatemala 7672149295 11373626177 8465686208 0,03% 0,05% 0,04%
Honduras 4945601183 6211454322 5571718259 0,02% 0,03% 0,03%
Hong Kong SAR, China 36207154008 2,21E+11 45414810061 0,16% 1,00% 0,21%
Hungary 20905371063 27087889688 19797051123 0,09% 0,12% 0,09%
Iceland 2391774592 2710532195 2296226107 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
India 6,32E+11 6,55E+11 6,47E+11 2,86% 2,96% 2,93%
Indonesia 1,64E+11 1,79E+11 1,60E+11 0,74% 0,81% 0,72%
Ireland 44613840370 38854306611 34529928720 0,20% 0,18% 0,16%
Israel 77079641863 78348613933 76128574988 0,35% 0,35% 0,34%
Italy 2,88E+11 3,24E+11 2,83E+11 1,30% 1,46% 1,28%
Japan 1,10E+12 1,14E+12 1,08E+12 4,96% 5,15% 4,90%
Jordan 12206993385 16104140599 15156876495 0,06% 0,07% 0,07%
Kazakhstan 1,20E+11 1,04E+11 1,20E+11 0,54% 0,47% 0,54%
Korea, Rep. 4,95E+11 4,47E+11 4,62E+11 2,24% 2,02% 2,09%
Kuwait 40494081136 46160490424 45832970353 0,18% 0,21% 0,21%
Latvia 4187996499 7639154141 5057899695 0,02% 0,03% 0,02%
Lithuania 6622329927 10556699912 7213830539 0,03% 0,05% 0,03%
Luxembourg 11137100319 13625537709 12491564508 0,05% 0,06% 0,06%
Macedonia, FYR 3181823841 3112756981 3400403639 0,01% 0,01% 0,02%
Madagascar 924205797,1 1917537820 1015734330 0,00% 0,01% 0,00%
Malawi 447190762,1 1125196562 509394722,4 0,00% 0,01% 0,00%
Malaysia 98146911106 81289447421 88570438796 0,44% 0,37% 0,40%
Malta 1626246536 5722300507 3351238777 0,01% 0,03% 0,02%
Mauritius 1895389471 3018566068 2230043870 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Mexico 2,73E+11 3,00E+11 2,69E+11 1,24% 1,36% 1,22%
Mongolia 15342252956 10957665097 14889489866 0,07% 0,05% 0,07%
Montenegro 969344247,9 1347680705 1228753707 0,00% 0,01% 0,01%
Morocco 23700499180 27215043770 26142452859 0,11% 0,12% 0,12%
Myanmar 3324187163 11648907333 3646843379 0,02% 0,05% 0,02%
Netherlands 1,56E+11 1,93E+11 1,63E+11 0,70% 0,87% 0,74%
New Zealand 36684698849 40301737172 36384970973 0,17% 0,18% 0,16%
Continued on next page
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Name Rp Rc R^ Rp % Rc % R^ %
Norway 67719619590 64691618860 60164796476 0,31% 0,29% 0,27%
Oman 26532718595 25388014464 26384399255 0,12% 0,11% 0,12%
Pakistan 49520237012 63109900838 53798534579 0,22% 0,29% 0,24%
Panama 7136461255 18245992844 11457386590 0,03% 0,08% 0,05%
Paraguay 2447297028 4349446703 2580545198 0,01% 0,02% 0,01%
Peru 29894216729 35819457421 30362084307 0,14% 0,16% 0,14%
Philippines 44698648334 65495171947 48298536404 0,20% 0,30% 0,22%
Poland 1,53E+11 1,44E+11 1,57E+11 0,69% 0,65% 0,71%
Portugal 31544460685 36818986003 33671672951 0,14% 0,17% 0,15%
Qatar 49011271995 35577329407 37512194567 0,22% 0,16% 0,17%
Romania 31689430307 37801725185 33173052202 0,14% 0,17% 0,15%
Russian Federation 6,87E+11 5,78E+11 6,47E+11 3,10% 2,61% 2,93%
Saudi Arabia 2,29E+11 2,60E+11 2,57E+11 1,03% 1,17% 1,16%
Senegal 3577070649 5641480741 4892274701 0,02% 0,03% 0,02%
Singapore 33938950367 91309152238 35298064689 0,15% 0,41% 0,16%
Slovak Republic 19442264248 22320551598 19362948648 0,09% 0,10% 0,09%
Slovenia 10144543509 10103859206 10158874829 0,05% 0,05% 0,05%
South Africa 2,16E+11 1,78E+11 2,08E+11 0,98% 0,80% 0,94%
Spain 1,86E+11 2,12E+11 1,89E+11 0,84% 0,96% 0,85%
Sri Lanka 6047786634 11719048907 6735889037 0,03% 0,05% 0,03%
Sweden 50065364880 65923274800 49176669182 0,23% 0,30% 0,22%
Switzerland 55909694967 87491062269 52373763584 0,25% 0,40% 0,24%
Tanzania 4162436868 8295999357 4775958571 0,02% 0,04% 0,02%
Thailand 1,15E+11 1,08E+11 1,06E+11 0,52% 0,49% 0,48%
Turkey 1,58E+11 1,85E+11 1,70E+11 0,72% 0,84% 0,77%
Uganda 2122481762 3248918014 2314394393 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Ukraine 62578502203 49373052359 64074966109 0,28% 0,22% 0,29%
United Arab Emirates 1,08E+11 1,40E+11 1,31E+11 0,49% 0,63% 0,59%
United Kingdom 5,23E+11 6,00E+11 5,55E+11 2,36% 2,71% 2,51%
United States 5,60E+12 5,84E+12 5,80E+12 25,33% 26,42% 26,20%
Uruguay 5980370922 8094841645 6293276527 0,03% 0,04% 0,03%
Vietnam 62107545775 72472134358 65389307320 0,28% 0,33% 0,30%
Continued on next page
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Name Rp Rc R^ Rp % Rc % R^ %
Yemen, Rep. 9330384429 12148566184 11136603659 0,04% 0,05% 0,05%
Zambia 1442533858 3453150848 1248549931 0,01% 0,02% 0,01%
Zimbabwe 7652306325 8584491579 8507577242 0,03% 0,04% 0,04%
Total Sample 2,21E+13 2,21E+13 2,21E+13 100% 100% 100%
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